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CASE COMMENTS

FEDERAL PROCEDURE
Questionablejoinder to prevent removal
In Parksv. New York Times Company' the resident plaintiff
instituted a libel action in an Alabama state court against
four residents and a nonresident alleging that the nonresident,
the New York Times, published an advertisement defaming
certain public officials because of their handling of purported
race riots. The resident defendants who failed to disaffirm
the New York Times act of incorporating their names within
the advertisement as endorsers of its contents were joined
in the action for their alleged ratification of the libelous
advertisement. Upon petition to the Federal District Court,
the nonresident defendant contended that the plaintiff had
fraudulently joined the resident defendants in order to preclude
removal from the state to the federal court. The District
Court sustained the removal petition asserting that there
was no "liability of the resident defendants under any recognized theory of Alabama law,"2 and on appeal the Circuit
Court reversed and remanded to the state court for trial on
the merits.
Since complete diversity of citizenship is a prerequisite
for invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 3 the
federal courts introduced the procedural rule of fraudulent
joinder in order to prevent a nonresident from being deprived
of his right of removal. However, the courts when applying
the principles of fraudulent joinder have been confronted with
diametrically opposed substantive rights of the litigants.
The resident plaintiff has the right to select the forum and
join all parties that are jointly and severally liable in one
action but not to the degree that the joinder fraudulently
deprives the nonresident of his right of removal to the federal
court.

I Parks v. New York Times Company, 308 F.2d 474
2

(5th Cir., 1962).
Parks v. New York Times Company, 195 F.Supp. 919, 922 (M.D. Ala.,

1961).
3

Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 265 (1806); Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868,
870 (5th Cir., 1957).
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Therefore, in order not to "modify, abridge, or enlarge
the substantive rights of the litigants or to enlarge or diminish
the jurisdiction of the federal court"4 the federal courts have
consistently utilized the following tests in determining whether
there was a fraudulent joinder: (1) Did the resident plaintiff
"have a real intention on colorable grounds to procure a joint
judgment?" 5 (2) Is there sufficient doubt as to the liability
of the resident defendant under the substantive law of the
state where the action is brought? ( In fact, even though the
resident plaintiff joins the resident and nonresident for the
sole purpose of precluding removal, the joinder although
fraudulent in intent is permissible if a cause of action is stated.7
When the principle of fraudulent joinder was orginally
pronounced, the procedural rules permitting joinder of parties
as joint tortfeasors or master and servant were stringently
construed. At the present time three views govern the joinder
of master and servant in the same action. Ohio procedure
illustrates the view which prohibits the joinder of master and
servant "if the master's liability is based solely on respondeat
superior."s Although Virginia procedure permits master and
servant to be joined in the same action, there can be no joinder
when the plaintiff states a related claim against the servant
since there is no liability on the part of the master for this
cause of action. 9 Finally, under the federal rules and modern
code pleading states all "persons may be joined in one action
462 Stat. 961 (1948); U. S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (2d Cir., 1941);
Warf & Warehouse v. Pillsbury, 259 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir., 1958).
5Morris v. E. I. DuPont De Nemour & Co., 68 F.2d 788, 791 (8th Cir.,
1934); Smith v. Southern Pacific Co., 187 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir.,
1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 823.
6 Wells v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 87 F.2d 579, 582 (8th Cir., 1937); Chumley
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 190 F.Supp. 254, 256 (M.D. N.C.,

1961).

7Norwalk v. Air Way Electric Appliance Corp., 87 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir.,
1937); Smith v. Southern Pacific Co., 187 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir.,
1951), cert. den. 342 U.S. 823.
8 French v. Central Construction Co., 76 Ohio St. 509, 81 N.E. 751 (1907);
Shaver v. Shirks Motor Express Corp., 163 Ohio St. 484, 127 N.E.2d

355, 362 (1955); Wells, Joinder of Master and Servant, 23 OHIO ST.

L.J. 488, 491 (1962).

9 Norfolk Union Bus Terminal, Inc., v. Sheldon, 188 Va. 288, 49 S.E.2d
338 (1948); The Notice of Motion and Modern Procedure, 35 VA. L.

REV., 380, 389 (1949).
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as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative any right to relief. . ." 1o Since there
has been a gradual development of procedural rules facilitating
the joinder of defendants, especially master and servant, in the
same action, "the principle of fraudulent joinder, although originally designed to balance the substantive rights of the litigants,
has been a tool-as reflected in the Parkscase-for recognizing
the plaintiff's substantive right to select the forum and join
all parties that are jointly and severally liable.
In past decisions where fraudulent joinder was alleged
by the nonresident, the courts have consistently permitted a
joinder of a resident agent with a nonresident principal in a
tort action when the agency relationship existed at the time of
the tort. In the Parks case, there was no agency relationship
at the time of the tort as the nonresident was a complete
stranger to the resident defendant. The resident plaintiff
in his cause of action asserted that the resident defendant
ratified the nonresident's act even though the resident received
no ascertainable benefit from the unauthorized act of the
nonresident. After reviewing the substantive law of Alabama,
the court relying on Birmingham News Co. v. Birmingham
Printing Co.12 reasoned that "silence alone will not always
suffice to even invite a conclusion that ratification was effected;
yet under the related circumstances shown to have been
known to the asserted principal, silence may afford evidence
from which the jury may infer an intent to ratify." 13 Even in a
libel action with a similiar fact situation as in the Parks case
where failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time did not
amount to ratification, the court stated that "silence would
be at most a fact situation from which in connection with
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (a).

1"Annot., 59 A.L.R. 2d 1066 (1958): Alabama-Sarber v. Hollon, 265 Ala.
323, 91 So.2d 229 (1956); California-Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 149, 157 P.2d 1 (1945); Illinois-Laver v. Kingston,
11 Il1. App.2d 323, 137 N.E.2d 113 (1956); Maryland-BeinhauerLeader Stores, Inc., v. Burlingame, 152 Md. 284, 136 A.2d 622 (1949);
North Carolina-Shaw v. Barnar, 229 N.C. 713, 51 S.E.2d 295 (1949);
Pennsylvania-East Broad Top Transit Co. v. Flood, 326 Pa. 353, 192
A. 401 (1937); Virginia-McLaughlin v. Siegel, 166 Va. 374, 185 S.E.
873 (1936); West Virginia-State ex rel. Baumgarner v. Simms, 139
W.Va. 92, 19 S.E.2d 277 (1953).
12 Birmingham News Co. v. Birmingham Printing Co., 209 Ala. 403, 96 So.
336, 341 (1923).
'3 Id. at 341.
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other facts and circumstances an actual ratification might
be inferred." 14 In summary, "although the mere fact of
acquiescence may be deemed far less cogent where no such
relation of agency exists,"15 ratification is a question of
fact for the jury to determine unless the facts are clear
beyond a substantial doubt.' 6 Although the "facts and
authorities indicate that the question of liability is a close
one,"17 the joinder is not fraudulent since the plaintiff has
stated a cause of action under Alabama law with a question of
fact to be adjudicated where the action was brought, not
where removed.
Finally, in order to sustain the burden of proof, the removing party must prove by clear and convincing evidence '
that the joinder is fraudulent. The courts have strictly adhered
to this rule and have remanded doubtful issues to the state
courts. 19 In cases where the joinder has been held to be
fraudulent, the plaintiff upon joinder did not even state a
cause of action against the resident defendant'0 or where the
resident defendant was not even present at the time of the
automobile accident. 2 1 The removing party, as in the Parks
case, will inevitably fail to sustain the burden of proof where
"there is any controversy, however slight, on the facts." 2
In conclusion, the gradual development of judicial precedent or legislation establishing procedural rules permitting
the joinder of master and servant in the same action coupled
with the principles of fraudulent joinder readily enables
the party bringing the action to select the forum and preclude
removal from the state to the federal court where there is a
lack of complete diversity of citizenship.
R.S.
14 Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1066, 1069 (1942); Dawson v. Holt, 11 Tenn. 583,

47 Am.Rep. 312 (1883).
15 Seavey, Ratification by Silence, 103 U.P.A. L.REV.30, 33 (1954).
13 Id.at 39.
17 Parks v. New York Times Company, 308 F.2d 474, 480 (5th Cir., 1962).
18 Id.at 478.

19 James v. National Pool Equipment Co., 186 F.Supp. 598, 604 (S.D.
1960).
Ill.
20Johnson v. Weyerhauser Company, 189 F.Supp. 735, 736 (D.C. Oregon
1960).
21Tinney v. McClain, 76 F.Supp. 694, 699 (N.D. Texas 1948); Poito v.
Malosky, 123 F.2d 258, 261 (8th Cir., 1941).
22
MaiIs v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 51 F.Supp. 562, 565 (W.D.
Missouri 1943).

